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—Insurance Contracts
Vincent H. Smith, Hayley H. Chouinard, and Alan
Almost Ideal Area Yield Crop
E. Baquet
Using yield data for a sample of 123 dryhmd wheat producers in Montana, the effects of three
area yield contracts, including the contract currently offered by the United States Federal Crop
Insurance Corporation and two individual yield contracts on individual farm yield variability,
are examined. The results indicate that while the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation area
yield contract provides all farmers in the sample with some protection against yield
variability, a simpler, actuarially equivalent “almost ideal” area yield contract provides
substantially larger reductions in yield variability. However, actuarially equivalent individual
yield contracts provide levels of protection against yield variability similar to those obtained
under the “almost ideal” area yield contract at much lower premiums.
The debate over farm programs that preceded pas-
sage of the 1990 United States Food, Agricultural,
Conservation and Trade Act (the 1990 Farm Bill)
took place in the context of a government wide
drive to reduce the federal budget deficit. During
the course of that debate, serious attention was
given by both the House and Senate agricultural
committees to the costs of the federal crop insur-
ance program, which was variously estimated to
have cost the federal government between $700
million and $800 million per year in subsidies for
administrative expenses and the payment of in-
demnities for losses. The subsidies in and of them-
selves constituted a problem for the program. The
fact that ad hoc disaster relief bills had commonly
been passed to deal with damage to crops and live-
stock from “Acts of God” during the 1980s also
called into question the validity of the program.
Under the 1980 Federal Crop Insurance Act, the
program had been deliberately expanded with re-
spect to the range of crops covered and the geo-
graphic regions in which insurance would be avail-
able to obviate the need for ad hoc disaster relief to
the farm sector. Most farmers, however, chose not
to participate in the program (participation rates
averaged just over 20 percent during that period)
and, instead, elected either to use other methods
for managing income risk or to rely on the political
system to provide free (to the farmer) protection
through ad hoc disaster relief bills.
Theauthors,respectively,areAssistantProfessor,ResearchAssociate,
and AssociateProfessor,Departmentof AgriculturalEconomics and
Economics, Montana State University. The authors gratefully admowl-
edge the valuable comments of three anonymous reviewers.
In fact, the Congressional House and Senate a~-
ricultural committees and the administration d;-
cided not to change the existing federal crop insur-
ance program in the 1990 farm bill but did agree to
review the program in subsequent Congressional
sessions and to allow the FCIC to test new prod-
ucts on a pilot basis. Budgetary pressures did not
ease during the early 1990s and major innovations
in the structure of the federal crop insurance pro-
gram are now being examined by the Federal Crop
Insurance Corporation (FCIC), which administers
the federal crop insurance program, in response to
initiatives from both the Clinton Administration
and the Congress. In particular, the FCIC is intro-
ducing a national area yield crop insurance pro-
gram-called the Group Risk Plan (GRP)—and,
for the 1993–94 crop year, is offering area yield
contracts in over 100 wheat or soybean producing
counties on a pilot project basis.
Area yield insurance contracts (first proposed by
Halcrow in 1949) provide the purchasing farmer
with an indemnity only when average yields across
all farms in the area fall below a critical yield,
Typically, it is assumed, the individual farm’s
yield will have only a small impact on area yield
and therefore area yield crop insurance contracts
do not provide such large incentives for moral haz-
ard or adverse selection. As Miranda has argued,
area yield insurance does provide farmers whose
individual yields are closely correlated with area
yields with considerable protection against yield
and, therefore, income variation. The exact form
of the area yield contract may have a substantial
impact on the amount by which the variance of a
farm’s yields and income can be reduced.
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This paper examines the effects of alternative
area yield contracts on the variance of farm output
and income net of insurance premiums. We show
for a sample of 123 dry land wheat producing
farms from the same county in Montana that the
current area yield contract being offered is sub-
optimal. A simpler and more flexible area yield
contract would permit the average farmer in the
sample to reduce the variance of its yields by about
20 percent more than the current GRP contract.
Alternative Multiple Peril and Area Yield
Crop Insurance Programs
From its inception in 1938 until 1993, the FCIC
provided insurance coverage to the individual farm
against individual farm losses from multiple per-
ils. 1 Under a typical multiple peril crop insurance
(MPCI) contract the farm incurs a loss when its
actual yield falls below a predetermined percent-
age, ai, of its average yield, ~i.2 Historically, the
farm has been able to choose one of three yield
election values for u; O.5, 0.65 or 0.75. Contracts
with 50 percent and 65 percent yield elections have
been more heavily subsidized than contracts with
75 percent yield elections. In the event of a loss,
the indemnity paid to the farm is the difference
between this critical yield, yCi = aip,i, and the
actual yield, multiplied by the price election se-
lected by the farm. Gardner and Kramer have
pointed out that over the history of the program
from 1938–83, except for periods in which MPCI
was offered only on a very limited basis, indem-
nities or losses paid out by the program have typ-
ically exceeded the premiums paid into the pro-
gram resulting in loss ratios (the ratio of indemni-
ties to premiums) well in excess of one. In the
1980s, as Miranda has reported, the average loss
ratio for the entire MPCI program increased to just
over two. 3
Most economic analyses of the current MPCI
program attribute the high loss ratios observed
throughout most of the program’s history to prob-
lems of adverse selection and moral hazard. In the
1Undera multipleperil contract the farmer is protected from all crop
lnsses other than those caused by poor farming practices.
2 For cmp insurance purposes, the farm’s average yield is determined
by FCIC to be its ten year actual production history (APH) or, if a
complete ten year history is not available, by a combination of its actual
available production history and proxies such as its ASCS yield. Skees
and Reed have argued that this approach to yield determination may
result in adverse selection because of upward drift in yields over time
because of technical irinovation,
3 The 1980sincluded two of the three most severe drought years since
1910 in the com belt and the Great Plains, Thus, any cmp jnsurance
program would probably have experienced loss ratios in excess of one.
context of crop insurance, adverse selection occurs
when, among the pool of insurable farms, those
farms with higher probabilities of loss (and there-
fore positive expected returns from purchasing in-
surance) are more likely to purchase insurance.
Moral hazard occurs when the purchase of insur-
ance causes the farmer to alter production practices
to increase the probability of a loss in ways that
cannot be monitored by the insurer.4 The potential
for both problems in the MPCI program has long
been recognized (e.g., Chambers; Halcrow; Gard-
ner and Kramer; Miranda; Nelson and Loehman)
although only recently have studies provided em-
pirical evidence of adverse selection (Goodwin;
Goodwin and Kastens; and Just and Calvin, 1993a)
and moral hazard (Coble, et al.; Horowitz and
Lichtenberg; Goodwin and Kastens; Just and
Calvin, 1993b), In fact, the absence of private in-
surance programs has been taken as at least partial
evidence of the severity of these problems (Gard-
ner and Kramer; Miranda). However, Bardsley et
al. have suggested that the benefits of actuarially
fair individual crop insurance are small even for
farmers with highly variable yields and therefore
that there is no mutually beneficial crop insurance
contract for both insurer and insuree. 5
In 1949, Halcrow proposed area yield crop in-
surance as an alternative to individual yield crop
insurance that would resolve problems of adverse
selection and moral hazard. His proposal was
largely ignored until 1991 when Miranda resur-
rected the idea and examined the relative effects of
area yield and individual yield contracts on the
variance of net farm yields and (by implication)
gross returns. Miranda examined an area yield
contract that had two components, a critical area
yield, y=, which would trigger indemnity pay-
ments, and a coverage level, +. When area yield,
Y, falls below the critical yield, assuming for sim-
plicity that indemnities are paid in bushels per
acre, indemnities received by the farmer, n, equal
+ibci – Y); when Y exceeds yci then n is zero.6
Under the contract examined by Miranda the
4 Moral hazard is clearly the result of asymmetric information and
therefore often is examined in the framework of the principal agent
problem (for examples, see Grossman and Hw, Arrrott and Stiglitz;
Nelson and Loehman),
5 Bardsley, et al.’s results suggest that the benefits of rainfall insur-
ance for Australian dry land wheat producers from reductions in income
variation are so small that they are less than the administrative costs
incurred by private insurers in offering such contracts. Quiggin has
disputed Bardsley et al,’s results, and both Fraser and Patrick have
reported quite large estimates of willingness-to-pay for multiple peril
crop insurance by risk averse farmers.
6 This involves no 10ssof generality from an analytical perspective as
total premiums are proportional to the price at which a crop is valued
under both multiple peril and area yield crop insurance programs,
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farm makes only one choice. It selects +i but is
offered only one critical yield election (that is, ai is
determined by the insurer). This contract is quite
restrictive. An “ideal” contract would allow the
farmer to choose both the critical yield and the
coverage level. The farm would choose the critical
yield, yCi = ctip, by selecting the proportion, a-i,
of the long run average or expected area yield, p,
against which to insure and also would select the
optimal coverage level. In effect, as Miranda
pointed out, area yield contracts offer the farm a
hedge against area yield variations through a put
option.
Miranda showed that an area yield contract
could provide most farms with substantial reduc-
tion in net yield variations although Williams et al.
and Carriker et al. demonstrated that area yield
programs are second order stochastically domi-
nated by actuarial equivalent individual yield in-
surance contracts. ?’An interesting feature of the
ideal area yield contract is that farmers may select
any non-negative values for ~i and @i. Thus a
farmer could choose to purchase a contract under
which it receives indemnities when actual yields
are greater than average yields (CYi> 1) and/or
receive indemnities that are greater than the differ-
ence between the critical area yield and the actual
average area yield, (+i > 1).8 Contracts in which
@i> 1 are optimal area yield contracts for many of
the farms in Miranda’s example.
If individual yield contracts are associated with
irreducible problems of moral hazard and adverse
selection then an area yield program, which offers
some protection against yield risk to most farmers
but vastly reduces incentives for adverse selection
and moral hazard, may be a viable alternative to an
individual yield program. The FCIC is currently
carrying out pilot programs in which GRP area
yield contracts are being offered to soybean pro-
ducers and wheat producers in over 100 selected
counties. In addition, in the spring of 1994, similar
contracts will be offered in over 1200 counties for
barley, corn, cotton, peanuts and grain sorghum.
7 The results presented by Williams, et al. and Carriker, et al. are not
surprising. In the early 1960s, Borch showed that it is always possible to
offer an insurance contract in wbicb the purchaser receives a fixed in-
come stream equal to his expected income stream which has no variance.
In the absence of problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, such
a contract is optimal when the insuree is risk averse and the insurer is risk
neutral,
8 For example, suppose that the expected vafue of the average area
yield, ~, is 30 bushels and that the farm chonses in a contract in which
LY.i= 1.33 and J+, = 1,5, The farm’s critical yield is then 40 bushels (yC,
= %w). If the acmal ma yield is 35 bushels then the f- receives an
indemnity of 7.5 bushels (@i@Cl– y]). The indemnities paid out under
such a contract would he much larger than those paid under a contract
where both a and@ were less than one, but the premiums would also be
much higher (assuming that both contracts were actuarially fair).
The FCIC pilot area yield contract is similar to the
ideal area yield contract in that each farmer
chooses a ~gger yield by picking an CXiand, in
addition, selects a coverage level, @i, that also
affects its indemnities. One important difference is
that under the pilot program the trigger yield can
be no greater than 90 percent of the average area
yield and the coverage level can be no greater than
150 percent; that is, &i <0.9 and @i s 1.5. The
FCIC area yield pilot insurance contract is there-
fore more restrictive than the “ideal” area yield
contract and thus is likely to result in smaller re-
ductions in yield and income variances for at least
some farms: A second difference is that indemnit-
ies are calculated slightly differently. Under the
GRP contract, ni = M~[@i@Ci – y)/rxi,O]. Given
that ~i is restricted to be less than or equal to 0.9,
this approach results in proportionally larger in-
creases in indemnities as area yields fall. How-
ever, note that, as is the case with the ideal con-
tract, ni >0 if and only if yCi> y.
The FCIC may well have chosen this structure
for political reasons. If the farmer picks an u,
zrea~er than one indemnities will be received everi
~hen actual area yield exceeds its average level.
Such an outcome might not look much like indi-
vidual disaster relief to policy makers. A similar
political problem with respect to @i is circum-
vented by FCIC through describing the farmer’s
choice of @ias if it were a choice about the valu-
ation of the crop.9 However, if@ became too large
the program might again be criticized for being too
generous, even though it might be actuarially fair.
Miranda’s study of 102 Kentucky soybean produc-
ers, however, suggests that such restrictions might
considerably reduce the benefits of an area yield
program. His results suggest that some producers
will enjoy much greater reductions in yield vari-
ance if they can pick values +i that are greater
than 1.
An alternative and simpler approach to the ideal
area yield contract is a contract tha~ allows the
farm only to choose any trigger yield—that is, to
select any value for ~l—but constrains the value of
the coverage level, @i, to be one. Two questions
are relevant with respect to this contract. First,
how large is the variance reduction obtained under
this type of contract relative to those obtained un-
der the current FCIC pilot contract and under an
9 Under the pilot GRP wheat program for 1993, each busbel of loss is
valued at $2.80 if+ equals 1. If, for example, @were set at its maximum
value of 1.5, then each bushel of loss is valued at $4.20-but that is, of
course, equivalent to inflating the indemnity in terms of bushels by 1.5.
Note that $4,20 per bushel is a relatively high price for wheat and in
excess of the current target price of $4,.00.
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Table 1. Five Area and Individual
Yield Contracts
Area yield contracts
AYC1: The current FCIC pilot area yield contract under
which al 50.9 and @is 1.5.
AYC2: The ‘4almost ideaf” contract under which aj
may take on any non-negative value but
+, = 1.
AYC3: The ideal contract under which both ai and r$t
may take on any non-negative value.
Individual yield contracts
IYC1: The farm is constrained to insure at 75 percent
of its average yield (ai = 0.75).
IYC2: The farm is constrained to insure at 90 percent
of its average yield (esi = O.90).
ideal area yield contract. Second, how large are the
values for cii that are chosen by participating
farms .
The three area yield contracts discussed above
offer much higher levels of insurance against area
yields than have been provided against individual
yields under the MPCI program. A fairly common
explanation of low MPCI participation rates has
been that the maximum trigger yield of 75 percent
of average individual yields provides many farms
with no protection against yield losses because
their yields rarely or never fall below 75 percent of
their average yields. 10Thus, for purposes of com-
parison, we also examine the effects on yield vari-
ance of two individual yield insurance programs.
The first, IYC1, mirrors the current MPCI pro-
gram by restricting the farm’s trigger yield to be 75
percent of its average yield; the second, IYC2, sets
the farm’s trigger yield at 90 percent of its average
yield. The key characteristics of these contracts—
the FCIC pilot contract (AYC1), the “almost
ideal” contract (AYC2) and the “ideal” contract
(AYC3) and the two individual yield contracts
(IYC 1 and IYC2)—are summarized in Ta-
ble 1.
Theoretical Model
Following Miranda, consider a farm in an area
(county) whose yield is random. The farm’s yield,
Yi, can be orthogonally projected onto the area
yield, y, to obtain the following identity:
(1) Yi=l-%+Pi(Y-W)+ej,
where,
(2) Pi = cov(Yi,Y)/u2y
(3) E(ei) = O; Var(ei) = u2ei; Cov(y, ei) = O,
(4) ‘@i) = Pi; Var(.YJ = G2yi,
(5) E(y) = p; Var(y) = r_r2y.
Thus equation (1) decomposes changes in individ-
ual yield into a component that is systematically
related to area yield, through the term ~i~ – p),
and a random component, ei, uncorrelated with
area yield. The coefficient pi measures the sensi-
tivity of individual yield to movements in area
yield. If (3iis greater (less) than one, changes in the
area average yield result in larger (smaller) abso-
lute changes in farm i’s individual yield.
As noted above, under an area yield contract in
which the coverage level +i is one, the farm re-
ceives a positive indemnity when its trigger yield,
yCi, exceeds the actual area yield; otherwise the
indemnity, ni, is zero; that is,
(6) ni = Max(ycj – y; o),
If the per acre premium, ri, is fair, it is equal to the
expected value of the indemnity, E(nj) and, as Mi-
randa notes, each contract can be evaluated solely
in terms of effects on the variance of net yield if
producers are mean variance utility maximizers. 11
This assumption is also adopted here. Net yield,
y~t is defined as:
(7) Y?t = yi + ni – ri.
and its variance, which measures the farm’s yield
risk, is therefore
(8) Var(y~’) = U*Yi + dni + 2 Cov(yi,ni)
where U2nidenotes Var(rzi). The reduction in yield
risk of the i’th farm, as measured by the change in
the variance of net yield, is therefore:
(9) Di = Var(yi) – var(y~~
.
– U2~i – 2 COV@i ,~i)
If ei and y are uncorrelated, it follows that:
Miranda then introduces the concept of a critical
beta, (3C,such that
(11) Pci = – ‘2J2 “ cOv@,ni)
Note that (3Cihas a unique value for each trigger
yield yCi= rxfl, and therefore is unique for each Ui
because as ~i increases so does yci and, therefore,
10In ~ Smple of 31 California irrigated rice pdUCe~ examined by
Z.eringet al., very few farms expected to experience actnat yields tlrat
were less than 7S percent of their average yields,
11we absmact fmm my consideration of price risk in ~,e ~~Ysis
Tbus, following Miranda, yield risk is assumed to be the sole source of
farrrrrevenue variation.
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ni. The reduction in yield risk can then be written
as:
(12) Di = cr*ni[pi/pci – 1]
This expression is strictly positive as long as ~i >
(3Ci.The maximum value for & is 0.5 and, as
Miranda shows, the weighted average of the pi’s is
1 (where the weight for each farm is its share of
total area acreage). Thus most farms will enjoy
reductions in yield variability and yield risk under
an area yield program.
It can be shown that if @Cilies in the range O =
~Cis 0.5 then under weak regularity conditions @Ci
is monotonically increasing in ~i and that in the
limit, as Wiapproaches infinity, @,-i= 0.5 (Mi-
randa). In Miranda’s example, the upper limit
value for &i is reached when ~i = 1.25 and in the
sample presented below it is reached when ~i =
1.35. Interestingly, once the limit value for & is
reached, no farm can further reduce the variance of
its net yields by choosing a higher value for &i.
This occurs because, as is clear from equation
(11), when @Cis 0.5 the ratio of the vtiance of
indemnities to the covariance of indemnities and
area yield is – 1; that is, indemnities and area yield
have become perfectly negatively correlated in the
sense that a one unit increase in y reduces ni by one
unit. An “almost ideal” insurance contract under
which the farm only selects a value for ciitherefore
contains an implicit upper bound for both ~i and
the trigger yield.
Once a trigger yield, yCi, has been selected
through the choice of ~i the farmer maybe able to
further reduce the variance of net yields by opting
to receive an indemnity that is larger or smaller
than the “standard” indemnity, ni = yCi – Y,
when losses occur that is, it may opt for a ‘‘cov-
erage” level, @i, that differs from 1. Taking the
choice of the trigger yield as given, when @iis a
choice variable, the i’th farmer’s net yield be-
comes:
(13) Y?t = yj + @inj - +iri.
Note that the premium associated with the receipt
of ni is dso multiplied by @i to insure that the
contract remains actuarially fair. The variance re-
duction obtained from this form of area yield con-
tract is:
(14) Di = Var(yi) – Var(y~J
.
– ~~u~~ – 2 @j C@jj,nj).
Using equation (10), this expression can be rewrit-
ten as:
(15) Di = U2nj [@i “ ~i/@Ci – $fl .
Given that the choice of the trigger yield, and
therefore of @Ciand u.?, has already been made,
the locally optimal value for @ithat minimizes Di
is simply:
Equation (16) suggests that most farms will choose
a coverage level in excess of one. The maximum
value the farm can choose for 1.3Cthrough its choice
of a trigger yield is 0.5 and, as noted above, the
weighted average value of the pi’s is one. Thus
even if all farms selected the maximum risk reduc-
ing trigger yield, about half of the farms would opt
for t$i’s in excess of one and, given that at least
some farms will choose trigger yields for which ~Ci
< 0.5, even if their ~i’s are less than one their
optimal coverage levels may be larger than 1. In
some cases, where ~Ciis small and ~i is lar e, the
optimal coverage level may be very large. 1$
A Comparison of Alternative Area
Yield Contracts
The above theoretical analysis suggests that a glo-
bally optimal area yield contract (that maximizes
the i’th farm’s risk reduction) requires that the
farm be permitted to choose values for both ~i and
+i that may be greater than one. In other words,
many farms will find it optimal to “over insure”
against area yield. The current FCIC area yield
contract constrains the farm’s choice of the trigger
yield to be no more than 90 percent of average area
yield (~i s 0.9) and the coverage level to be less
than 150 percent (+i s 1.5), One important ques-
tion is how costly are the constraints of the FCIC
pilot area yield program to farmers in terms of lost
opportunities for risk reduction. A second is
whether a simpler contract exists that would pro-
vide levels of risk reductions that are close to those
available under the “ideal” contract for most
farms.
To address these issues empirically, data were
obtained on individual annual yields for 123 sep-
arately insured dryland wheat operations in Chou-
teau County, Montana, over the ten year period
1981–90 from the FCIC. 13,14The yield data for
12In M~da) ~Smple, the maximum optimal value fOr& was 4.77
(a coverage level of 477 percent), and coverage levels in excess of 200
percent were quite common.
13Dam on yields were available from FCIC only for f-s that had
insured their crops on at least one occasion durbrg the 1980s. The sample
used here, tberefnre, is not a random sample. However, since 1983, in
fmYgiven YW about 85 percent of all drykmd wheat acreage has been
iosuredin thatregionof Montana.Thus, the bias introduced by exam-
ining yields only for farms that have parchased MPCI may not be too
serious.
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Figure 1. Frequency Distribution of Individ-
ual Producer Betas
each farm were examined for trend over the 10
year period but no evidence of any trend was
found.15 Individual yields were weighted by each
operation’s share of total acreage planted by the
123 operations to estimate the annual average area
yield, y, for each year. This series also exhibited
no distinguishable time trend and thus a simple
average of the annual area yields over the sample
period was used as an estimate of the expected
value for the area yield, ~.
Estimates of the &’s were obtained for each
farm in the sample. A histogram of their distribu-
tion is presented in Figure 1. The range of values
for the fli’s is 0.24--1.93, only 11 farms in the
sample have pi’s that are less than 0.5 and no farm
in the sample is unable to obtain some risk reduc-
tion from any of the area yield contracts examined
below. About 56 percent of farms have (3i’s that
are less than one, indicating that smaller farms in
the sample tend to have smaller (3i’s(because the
acreage weighted average of the pi’s is 1).
Estimates of reductions in yield variance avail-
able under each of the three area yield contracts
described in Table 1 were obtained as follows.
First, estimates of the annual values for ni, Uni2and
~Ciwere computed for all values of cxiin the range
O-3 where CYiwas initially set equal to O and in-
creased in increments of 0.05. The limit value for
(3Ciwas obtained for Qiequal to 1.35. Thus no farm
in this sample could obtain any additional risk re-
14In this SamPIe,in several cases, the same producer f~s mOreMm
one of the operations but, as each operation is subject to a separate
insurance contract under the MPCI program, operations are not aggre-
gated by producers in the analysis presented here.
15I“sPwtjon of plots provided no evidence of any persistent mendsin
individual yields and when yields were linearly regressed on time, not
one of the 123 estimated coefficients on time was significantly different
frnm zero,
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duction from contracts in which ai > 1.35. Next,
for each farm, equation (12) was used to calculate
the risk reduction obtained from a contract in
which @iwas set equal to one for all values of ti
over the range of O-1.35 and the trig er yield (and5
corresponding values for PC and u. ) that maxi-
mized risk reduction under such a contract was
identified. This procedure identified the optimal
“almost ideal” contract for each farm in the sam-
ple. Next, to identify the “ideal” contract, equa-
tion (16) was used to identify the optimal value for
$,, given that ~i was set equal to its optimal value
under the’ ‘almost ideal” contract. 16Equation (15)
was then used to compute the risk reduction ob-
tained under the farm’s optimal “ideal” contract.
Optimal contracts under the FCIC pilot area
yield program were identified as follows. A farm
whose “ideal” contract consisted of an Wi< 0.9
and a @i< 1.5 still had access to such a contract
under the pilot program. Farms with an optimal tii
<0,9 and an optimal @i> 1.5 under the “ideal”
contract were constrained to set @iequal to 1.5,
Farms with an optimal Ui >0,9 were constrained
to set CXiequal to 0.9 and to select the optimal value
for ~i given that Wi= 0.9, unless that value for @i
exceeded 1.5. In that case, both Qi and @iwere set
equal to their limit values under the pilot program.
Risk reductions obtained under the optimal FCIC
pilot program were also computed using equation
(15). Finally, to facilitate comparisons of the risk
reductions achieved under each of the three con-
tracts, the absolute value of the decrease in vari-
ance of net yields obtained under each area yield
insurance contract, Di, was divided by the variance
of individual yields (that is, the variance of net
yields in the absence of any insurance contract),
Table 2 presents information on the average pro-
portional decrease in risk (that is, in the variance of
net yields) under each of the three area yield con-
tracts. The estimates of risk reduction are pre-
sented in absolute values and thus larger percent-
age changes imply larger reductions in risk. The
results presented in Table 2 are quite dramatic. The
current FCIC pilot program, AYC 1, provides the
average farm in the sample with a 52,5 percent
reduction in individual net yield variance. How-
ever, the “almost ideal” contract, AYC2, permits
the average farm to reduce the variance of it net
yields by 63 percent, a 19,9 percent larger reduc-
tion in risk than that provided by the FCIC pilot
16To check that this procedure resulted in a globafly-oPtimsIconmact
for the i’th farm, a search was carried out over all feasible values of a
arrd @ for a sub-sample of five individual farms. In each case, the
comprehensive search identified the same contract as the two-step pro-
cedure.
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Table 2. Proportional Decreases in Average
Farm Level Net Yield Variances Under Three
Alternative Area Yield Insurance Contracts
Number
of Farms AYC1 AYC2 AYC3
Percent change
All farms 123 52.54 63.00 65.62
contract. The “ideal” contract results in risk re-
duction of 65.6 percent for the average farm, an
improvement of only 4 percent relative to the “al-
most ideal” contract. The “almost ideal” con-
tract, which is simpler than both the FCIC pilot
contract and the “ideal” contract, provides sub-
stantially more risk reduction than the FCIC pilot
contract and almost as much risk reduction as the
“ideal” contract.
Information on the average characteristics of the
optimal area yield contracts purchased by farmers
are presented in Table 3. Under AYC 1, the FCIC
pilot contract, the average value for the &i’s is
0.876, very close to its limit value of 0.9. Thus
most farms in the sample will choose the maxi-
mum trigger yield, yC,under this contract. In con-
trast, under the pilot program, the average farm
selects a coverage level, @i,of 1.285 that is almost
14 percent lower than the limit value of 1.5.
The “almost ideal” program, AYC2, allows
farms more flexibility in their choice of trigger
yield but constrains them to select a @iof 1. Under
this contract, the average optimal trigger yield in-
creases by over 42 percentage points (the average
value of q increases from 0.876 to 1.246). How-
ever, the average farm in the sample also forced to
reduce its optimal coverage level (the average
v~ue for @ifalls from 1.285 to 1). These results
suggest that restrictions on the choice of the trigger
yield have much larger adverse effects on the abil-
ity of farms to reduce risk under area yield con-
tracts than do restrictions on coverage levels.
These findings are confirmed by a comparison
Table 3. Average and Maximum Trigger
Levels and Coverage Levels Selected Under
Three Alternative Area Yield
Insurance Contracts
AYC1 AYC2 AYC3
Average
Values ai 4, ‘% 4, % 4/
All farms .876 1.285 1.246 1.00 1.246 1.074
Maximum Values
All farms .900 1.500 1.350 1.00 1.350 1.926
of the “almost ideal” contract and the “ideal”
contract. Farms in the sample do not change their
trigger yields under the ideal area yield contract
from those selected under the almost ideal area
yield contract but do increase their coverage levels
by 7.4 percentage points (the average value for @i
increases from 1 to 1.074). As noted above, as a
result they obtain levels of risk reduction that are
about 4 percent higher.
The findings presented in Table 3 indicate that
farms purchase different levels of area yield insur-
ance coverage under each of the three contracts.
Under each contract, expected indemnities will be
different and, therefore, actuarially fair premiums
will be different. Table 5 presents the average ac-
tuarially fair premiums (in bushels per insured
acre) that would be charged if each farm chose its
optimal insurance plan under each contract. Under
the FCIC pilot contract, AYC 1, the average per
acre premium is 4.34 bushels; the per acre pre-
mium is more than twice as high, 11.05 bushels,
under the’ ‘almost ideal” contract, AYC2, and un-
der the “ideal” contract, AYC3, rises to 19.18,
almost double the premium for AYC2 and over
four times the premium for AYC1.
Table 5 provides interesting insights about why
the FCIC pilot contract might have been chosen.
First, if the government is committed to subsidiz-
ing a fixed percentage of expected losses, and
therefore premiums, from area yield insurance
contracts (as is implied for MPCI under the terms
of the 1980 Federal Crop Insurance Act), its total
fiscal outlays will be much smaller under the FCIC
pilot contract than under either the “almost ideal”
contract or, especially, the “ideal” contract. Sec-
ond, even though each of the contracts is actuari-
ally fair, farms may simply be reluctant to pay
relatively high per acre premiums for an individual
contract. If wheat output is valued at $2.80 per
acre (as is the case under the 1993 FCIC pilot
contract) then under the pilot contract, average per
acre premiums would be $12.15, under the “al-
most ideal” contract they would be $30.94, and
under the “ideal” contract they would be $53.70.
Average per acre yields in the sample were about
33 bushels per acre during the 1980s. Thus the
optimal “ideal” contract would require farmers to
pay about two thirds of expected gross revenues in
insurance payments, though they would also re-
ceive indemnities even in years when area yields
are considerably above average. This problem is
less severe under the “almost ideal” contract but
is still not a trivial concern.
A relevant issue with any area yield contract is
how it compares to current and alternative individ-
ual yield insurance contracts. Table 4 shows aver-
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Table 4. Proportional Decreases in Average
Farm Level Net Yield Variances Under Two
Area Yield Insurance Contracts and Two
Representative Individual Yield Insurance
Contracts (Percent Reduction in Net
Yield Variance)
yield risk protection but at much lower premiums.
Thus, even if there were no potential for gains
from asymmetric information under individual
yield contracts many farms would still prefer them
to area yield contracts because lower premiums
would place less stress on the farm’s cash flow.
Individual Yield
Area Yield Insurance Insurance
AYC1 AYC2 IYC1 IYC2
Percent reduction
All farms 52.54 63.00 46.55 64.31
age reductions in the variance of net yields under
the three area yield contracts, the 75 percent indi-
vidual yield contract that is currently available un-
der the MPCI program (IYC1) and the 90 percent
individual yield contract (IYC2). The 75 percent
individual yield contract provides risk reductions
(on average, a 46.5 percent decrease in net yield
variance) that are roughly equivalent to those
available under the FCIC pilot program (on aver-
age, a 52.5 percent decrease in net yield variance),
which suggests that the FCIC pilot program may
have been constructed with this goal in mind. The
90 percent individual yield contract provides re-
ductions in risk that are roughly equivalent to those
available under the “almost ideal” area yield con-
tract.
Average actuarially fair premiums for all five
contracts are presented in Table 5. The average per
acre premium for IYC 1 (2.63 bushels) is about 40
percent lower than that for AYC 1 (4.34 bushels)
although both contracts provide farms similar re-
ductions in yield risk. The average per acre pre-
mium for IYC2 (4.17 bushels) is over 60 percent
lower than that for AYC2 (1 1,05 bushels) al-
though, again, both contracts offer farms similar
reductions in yield risk. In other words, in the
absence of adverse selection and moral hazard, in-
dividual yield contracts provide farms with similar
Table 5. Average Per Acre Premiums Under
Three Area Yield Insurance Contracts and
Two Individual Yield Insurance Contracts
Individual Yield
Area Yield Insurance Insurance
AYC1 AYC2 AYC3 IYC1 IYC2
Bushels Per Acre
All farms 4.34 11.05 19.18 2.63 4.17
Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper has examined the effects of three alter-
native area yield crop insurance contracts on net
yield variance among a sample of 123 dryland
wheat operations. We have shown that the current
area yield pilot contract offered by the FCIC, un-
der which the farm has constrained choices both
with respect to its trigger yield and coverage level,
allows almost all farms to reduce yield variance
and yield risk quite significantly. However, a sim-
pler “almost ideal” area yield contract, that pro-
vides the farm only with an unrestricted choice of
trigger yield and a single coverage level of 100
percent, allows all farms in the sample to reduce
yield variability by much larger amounts but at
higher premiums. An “ideal” contract, under
which the choices of both the trigger yield and
coverage level are unconstrained, allows farms to
achieve only small additional yield risk reductions
relative to the “almost ideal” contract, but re-
quires most farms to pay substantially higher pre-
miums.
The above findings suggest that, because farm-
ers appear to benefit substantially from increased
opportunities to reduce yield risk under an actuar-
ially equivalent “almost ideal” area yield con-
tract, the FCIC should consider offering such a
contract, at least on an experimental basis. The
fact that the “almost ideal” contract is simpler is
also in its favor. A major concern among policy
makers and crop insurance administrators is how to
increase participation in insurance based disaster
mitigation programs. In that context, a simpler
area yield contract that is also more advantageous
for most farms may be a better deal for all of the
parties involved.
The results presented in this paper also indicate
that individual yield insurance contracts provide
about the same degree of yield risk reduction at
lower premium rates. Thus, even in the absence of
opportunities for moral hazard and adverse selec-
tion, in general, farmers will prefer an individual
yield program to an area yield program. Therefore,
if individual yield contracts could be “made” to
work efficiently-that is, moral hazard and ad-
verse selection problems could be overcome—they
would still be preferred. Work by Raviv and others
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suggests that in general, multi-period insurance
agreements in which premiums are tied to losses
(as with auto-insurance), go a long way to solving
moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Pol-
icy makers might therefore also consider experi-
menting with such contracts, at least on a pilot
basis, in addition to examining an expanded array
of area yield contracts.
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